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Civil War or Genocide? 
The United Nations Commission of Experts’ Misunderstanding of the Third 
Balkan War of the 1990s 
 
 
In July 1989, Robert Kaplan, a journalist for The Atlantic, analyzed and 
wrote on the economic and social unrest taking place in the Balkans, and 
commented on the worsening conditions within the Federal Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  He began his article with a broad, misinformed statement about the 
geneses of Balkan present-day conflicts: “The violence of the twentieth century 
has derived in large measure from the ethnic hatreds of the Balkans.”1 In the 
months that followed, the term “age-old hatreds” became a common description 
for the relationship between the nations of the Yugoslavia, especially after 
catastrophic dissolution in 1992. Coinciding with other geopolitical shifts in 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the crumbling Soviet bloc, 
members of the Slovene, Croat, Bosnian, and Kosovar intelligentsias advocated for 
greater autonomy and federal decentralization for a variety of purposes: republic-
based educational systems independent of federal curricula and standards, 
modernization (i.e. political reform), market mechanisms, and other freedoms 
comparable to the capitalist economics of European Community and the United 
                                                 
1 Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe’s Third World,” TheAtlantic.com, (originally published July 1989) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/unbound/flashbks/balkans/kaplanf.htm. For more on Kaplan’s 
influence see John B. Allcock, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” 
In Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, ed. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, 346-389 
(Washington D.C.: Purdue University Press, 2009). 
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 States.2 The resulting responses from Serbs and the Serb-dominated federal state 
were to maintain the federal government’s power and later to exchange 
populations, eventually graduating from economic disagreements to nationalist 
rhetoric intended to preserve Serbian national unity. Journalists and news reporters 
observing the escalating tensions agreed with and repeated Kaplan’s claims, and 
scathing documentaries and journalistic pieces covering the dire conditions of the 
war-torn country prompted the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping and 
military efforts.3  
An ad hoc committee, the United Nations Commission of Experts, was 
formed for the purpose of investigating the violations of human rights – including 
ethnic cleansing, widespread war rape, mass unmarked graves, concentration 
facilities, as well as military and paramilitary forces targeting civilians, women, 
                                                 
2 Kosovo was the epicenter for this disruptive infusion of economics and nationalism; as more 
(Muslim) Albanians migrated to Kosovo – and as more autonomy was awarded to the Yugoslav 
republics – many Serb intellectual and political leaders grew concerned of the growing economic 
arguments for Kosovo’s independence and other decentralizing policies aimed to weaken federal 
power, which would in turn scatter the Serb nation across many states. What originated as 
decentralization and economic gains among non-Serbs led to xenophobia and nationalist goals 
among Serbs. For more on the Yugoslav Communist Party’s decentralization as precursor to the 
conflict see Dejan Jović, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj,” in 
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992, ed. Dejan Djokić (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2003), 157-81. For more on the non-Serb political annunciations of autonomy 
and market westernization in Yugoslavia, see Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation’, 
Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2002). For more on Slovenian dissention at the federal level, especially 
regarding the Yugoslav Writers’ Union, see Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Intellectuals and the Collapse 
of Yugoslavia: The End of the Yugoslav Writers’ Union” in Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed 
Idea, 1918-1992, ed. Dejan Djokić (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 283. 
3 See, for example, one of the earliest and most popular journalistic works on the Third Balkan 
War: Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillin Publishing Company, 1993). 
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 and children – that were taking place in the former Yugoslavia.4  The reports of the 
Commission of Experts were involved in the UN Security Council’s decision-
making process, as evidenced by the Security Council’s adoption of the 
Commission’s recommendation to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia in 1993. The Commission’s research reports and 
investigations tended to repeat essentialist notions of ethnic incompatibilities 
promulgated largely by Serb nationalists. These essentialist notions reinforced a 
belief about the futility of intervention because they misguided the Commission’s 
writings on the genesis of the conflict. Given that the Commission misunderstood 
how the war erupted, their reports conflated elements of civil war with elements of 
genocide, and the UN Security Council – which reviewed and consulted the 
Commission’s findings – was provided unclear descriptions of the conflict and 
how it began, and consequently, how it should be addressed. 
By treating the region’s massacres of the Second World War as evidence 
of inherent conflict, the Commission adopted and repeated Serbian national myths, 
and therefore the Commission presented an image of the South Slavs as violently 
fratricidal (between civil war and genocide). This juxtaposition between World 
War II and the Third Balkan War would have also perhaps given rise to onlookers’ 
                                                 
4 “United Nations Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia;” M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports and Data 
Submitted To The Commission Between November 3-25, 1992, M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 
DePaul University Special Collections and Archives, DePaul University, Chicago IL (hereafter: 
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers). 
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 hopes that resolution among South Slavs would present itself just as it had in the 
country’s recent past.5 This is the greatest misunderstanding repeated by the 
Commission: in accepting Serbian national myths as fact, the Commission 
validated Serbian nationalist rhetoric. The Commission did not investigate how 
and why Serbian scholars and politicians presented this rhetoric, and therefore, the 
Commission (mis)understood the conflict by keeping their perspective within the 
evidential framework presented by Serb nationalists. In essence, Serb nationalists 
constructed and presented the war of the 1990s as an iteration of the war of the 
1940s, not only to combat propositions of economic freedoms, but also to preserve 
Serbian national unity. This reaction came about during the 1980s, when 
Albanians, Serbs, and Slovenes debated questions about Kosovo’s (and other 
republic’s) independence and sovereignty.6 An investigation of this particular issue 
– how the Kosovo question was deliberated during the 1980s – would have 
revealed the federal administrative issues in balancing socialist 
decentralization/democratization with nationalist programs for independence.7 
Within this nexus of issues arose further questions of how to address sovereignty, 
national rights, democracy, and cultural genocide – all ideas that the UN would 
                                                 
5 Given that the conflict of the 1940s had been resolved by the re-founding of Yugoslavia in 1945 
by the Partisan socialists, comparisons between the 1940s and the 1990s conflicts would perhaps 
have conflated the likelihood of another political resolution, or support the appearance of “history 
repeating itself.” 
6 Tea Sindbæk, Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s Difficult Past from 1945-2002 
(Copenhagen: Aarhaus University Press, 2012), 139-88. 
7 See Dragović-Soso,‘Saviours of the Nation,’ 115-45.  
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 litigate and address in the next decade – though prior to any successful 
intervention efforts. References to “ancient hatreds” or “age-long” disputes among 
South Slavs were, therefore, loaded phrases intended to distract from the economic 
reality and disparities among the Yugoslav republics; furthermore, the 
Commission’s ignorance of the conflict’s genesis and their adoption of Serbian-
constructed mytho-history was detrimental to peacekeeping efforts. 
When members of the Commission shared their observations of the 
conflict, they tended to feel the need to explain that the conflict was a long-
standing one – “age-old.” This view of the conflict’s genesis was due to the 
tremendous amount of evidence the Commission gathered and consulted: much of 
the evidence was first-hand experiences and testimonies from victims and 
aggressors, which often repeated a propagandized lexicon for describing the nature 
of the conflict. In expressing lengthy, detailed histories of South Slav conflicts, the 
Commission’s reports communicate the notion that the conflict was both a civil 
war and also the result of ongoing ethnic incompatibilities. Because the 
Commission portrayed the parties engaged in conflict in this way, their reports 
provided a wealth of evidence supporting and recapitulating popular 
misunderstandings (i.e. nationalist myths) about the Yugoslav conflict.8 It is 
plausible that because the UN Security Council reviewed the Commission’s 
                                                 
8 The Commission provided several hundred pages of reports and histories of the conflict(s), in 
addition to 65,000 pages of digital evidence, interviews, maps, and narratives stored and presented 
to the Security Council and the ICTY. 
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 reports, members of the Security Council adopted the myth of the age-old hatreds. 
Due to the armed conflicts emerging in other places of the world and requiring UN 
and United States attention and vigilance (Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq, Kuwait, former 
Soviet bloc countries, etc.), the Security Council may have viewed any UN-
sponsored attempt to intervene in an age-long war as futile – or perhaps 
conveniently so. Since these reports informed military/peacekeeping action and 
portrayed the conflict in distorted terms, and since the actions of the Security 
Council in the years following the Commission’s Final Report are recorded in 
great detail, it is plausible to suggest that the Security Council could not reconcile 
the legal ideation and information presented by the Commission – in addition to 
applying UN established principles uniformly.  
The fairly ineffectual nature of various UN efforts throughout the former 
Yugoslavia also suggests that the Commission’s reports did not expedite 
intervention efforts and/or perhaps may have halted the Security Council from 
further involvement. Though the Commission of Experts was determined to end 
systematic exterminations, their misunderstandings of both the region’s history 
and of the forces that led to inter-communal conflict allowed the Security Council 
to stall additional intervention efforts. While the Security Council litigated 
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, conflicts of international or 
internal nature, and dozens of UN principles and declarations, the conflict 
continued to worsen until the United States spearheaded the NATO bombing of 
6
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 regions occupied by the Yugoslav National Army and Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
forces escalating in February 1994.9  
Although the conflict was described as “age-old,” it was popularly 
recognized as the Yugoslav civil war, which had also carried unintended 
repercussions given the fact that it was presented alongside the ancient hatreds 
narrative. Misunderstanding the conflict to be a civil war paralyzed intervention 
efforts, because the parties that were engaged in conflict were discernable largely 
along national fault lines. If the various national identities contained within the 
umbrella identity of “Yugoslav” were essentially different, this meant that the 
conflict between Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs was an example of what the UN 
categorized as self-determination; evidenced by the immediate and widespread 
recognition of statehood following Slovenia’s, Croatia’s, and Bosnia’s secessions 
from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. When politicians, nongovernmental 
organizations, and journalists misinterpreted histories of inter-communal violence 
in the region, they agreed with prevailing assumptions and yet easily dismissed the 
conflict by simultaneously identifying it as a civil war resulting from an imagined 
lengthy history of constant civil war. The Security Council legitimized recognition 
                                                 
9 That is not to say that the NATO bombing was an appropriate means of action; despite the 
devastation of many Serb paramilitary occupied zones, the NATO strikes turned the tide of 
massacres, transferring the balance of power in the war torn former Yugoslavia from the Serb 
paramilitary to Croatian and Bosnian forces (which began working together since the Serb 
paramilitary and JNA greater outnumbered and outgunned bands of Croatian and Bosnian 
citizens). Moreover, the NATO air raids alone were highly destructive and effective, having 
devastating residual costs: casualties, broken urban infrastructure, and disconnected roadways, 
which further disrupted military mobilization. 
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 of the conflict as civil war because Yugoslavia had more or less existed for the 
entirety of the twentieth century, during which the populations had coexisted under 
various regimes. Yet, since the warring populations broke along national barriers 
(largely the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians) and for the purposes of creating new 
national states uninhibited by a Yugoslav federation, the conflict was treated as 
one of self-determination. As a conflict of self-determination, the UN had no 
precedent for intervention – hence “self.”  
This interpretation of the UN’s ideologically based response to the 
Yugoslav conflict is not entirely new in scholarship. Rosalyn Higgins, a professor 
of international law at the University of London, articulated the danger of treating 
the conflict as civil war in an edited text of a speech she delivered at the eighteenth 
Martin Wight Memorial Lecture at Sussex University.10 However, she delivered 
her speech on March 1, 1993 – a year after Bosnia had declared independence – so 
her account does not include an analysis of the UN’s treatment of the conflict as 
civil war, because the conflict was still young. Political scientist Peter Alan Sproat 
wrote a scathing analysis of the UN’s principle of self-determination, and he 
claimed that UN charters ambiguously discuss the principle, which he believes 
was responsible for the aggression and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. 
While it is not the purpose of the present article to condemn the UN (as Sproat 
                                                 
10 Rosalyn Higgins, “The new United Nations and former Yugoslavia,” International Affairs 69, 
no. 3 (1993): 465-83. 
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 explicitly states as one of his purposes), his perspective sheds light on the paradox 
of self-determination and its application to the Third Balkan War.11 William 
Maley, also a political scientist, addresses how the UN problematically applied 
three UN principles – sovereignty of states, self-determination, and human rights – 
when considering the best course of action.12  
Though the aforementioned scholars have analyzed the UN and its 
principles in relation to Yugoslavia, no historical account exists that analyzes the 
reception of reports generated by the Commission of Experts Special Rapporteur 
M. Cherif Bassiouni and the International Human Rights Law Institute, which 
managed the research and investigations overseen by the Commission. However, 
historian Jonathan May analyzed the underlying worldview that informed one 
particular British politician, Jeremy “Paddy” John Durham Ashdown, who served 
as the High Representative for Yugoslavia from 2002 to 2006. Like Bassiouni in 
the present article, May selected Ashdown as the subject of his micro-historical 
study because of Ashdown’s knowledge of political action during the Yugoslav 
conflict. May demonstrates a shift in Ashdown’s worldviews and ultimately argues 
that Ashdown subscribed to the “ancient hatreds” theory of Yugoslavia’s 
                                                 
11 Peter Alan Sproat, “The United Nations’ Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: 
Time to Abandon the Right to Self-Determination?” Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 1 
(1996): 93-113. 
12 William Maley, “The United Nations and Ethnic Conflict Management: Lessons from the 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” Nationalities Papers 25, no. 3 (1997): 559-73.  
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 dissolution.13 An investigation of the Commission and their reports is invaluable 
given the deficit of historical knowledge about the information and reportage 
provided to and utilized by the UN Security Council. 
When describing the nature of the Yugoslav conflict, Bassiouni and the 
Commission adopted the idea of age-old hatreds – a concept based on essentialism. 
According to this thinking, perpetual ethnic incompatibility legitimized the 
conflict because the warring peoples each had a right to self-determination. When 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia, the UN 
almost immediately recognized the statehood of each; but, when the Bosnian Serbs 
basically utilized the same principle of self-determination when seceding from 
newly independent Bosnia (under control of the Serb paramilitary) with intentions 
of rejoining what was left of Yugoslavia (i.e. Greater Serbia), the conflict was 
treated as a civil war. As a civil war of self-determination, the UN had no 
precedent for intervention. Effectively, the Security Council was not able to 
maneuver through all of the applicable UN principles established over decades by 
UN charters and declarations. 
The Serb nationalist narrative has since been discredited by experts in this 
field, but not before it had a significant impact on the international reaction to the 
conflict. Few scholars of Yugoslavia, if any, argue that the country’s dissolution 
                                                 
13 Jonathan May, “How Bosnia Changed Paddy,” East European Politics & Societies 27, no. 4 
(November 2013): 593-618 http://eep.sagepub.com/content/27/4/593.  
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 was inevitable or that the South Slav populations have deep seeded hatreds toward 
one another. Most scholars believe conflict between the nations of Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s was solely a product of the twentieth century, which is to say the 
country’s purpose for existence and what the country meant to each of these 
nations were the only real sources of tension.14 For example, Yugoslav scholar 
Bogdan Denitch states that aside from “communal massacres of Serbs by Croatian 
fascist Ustaša and massacres of Muslims and Croats by Serbian Chetniks during 
the Second World War, Serbs and Croats have lived together more or less 
tolerably for four centuries.”15 
Months after Kaplan’s article in The Atlantic, many of Kaplan’s predictions 
about the political dissolution of Yugoslavia matched the realities of the country. 
Decadal constitutional concessions since the 1950s provided greater autonomy to 
the Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia) and this decentralization weakened the federal 
power and influence of Yugoslavia. Competing interpretations of the Yugoslav 
national identity surfaced in elite political discussions from the early 1960s 
                                                 
14 Originally named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the country was renamed the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (literally, “Land of the South Slavs”) in 1929 in order to promote cultural 
integration, but over the course of the twentieth century, identity discussions on what constitutes 
“South Slav” and which populations (should) belong to the country bore sociopolitical importance. 
15 Denitch, op. cit., 62. Scholars using a variety of approaches agree: Dragović-Soso analyzes the 
development of twentieth-century Serbian intellectuals, Dragović-Soso, op. cit.; Wachtel uses 
popular print culture to understand changing constructions of national identity, Wachtel, op. cit.; 
and historian Tia Sindbæk comes to similar conclusions in her historiographical review of 
Yugoslav scholars writing on the genocide that occurred during the Second World War, Tia 
Sindbæk, op. cit. 
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 through the late 1980s, which fuelled these constitutional concessions.16 Shortly 
thereafter, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia seceded from 
the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The secessions of Croatia and 
Bosnia prompted a full-scale military response by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav 
National Army in order to protect the national unity of the Serb nation by 
preserving a single state in which all Serbs lived. Bosnia was the last of the three 
republics to secede, declaring independence in March 1992.  With the secession of 
Bosnia, Croatian militias, Bosnian civilians, and Serbian paramilitary forces 
erupted in conflict, each fighting the other two. Nonstandard soldiers from each of 
these nations began committing atrocities; quickly after the conflict began, 
Radovan Karadzić, the President of the newly founded Republika Srpska – a 
region controlled by Bosnian Serb rebels – encouraged a policy of “ethnic 
cleansing,” a euphemism to disguise a gravely nationalist genocidal movement 
largely executed by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. The United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR), and various European countries sent UN troops into Bosnia and 
Croatia, but these efforts were inadequate in stopping the rampant violations of 
                                                 
16 Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in 
Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 130. Wachtel, a literary historian, traces 
the cultural contours and complex conceptions of Yugoslavism beginning with the turn of the 
twentieth century. He argues that Yugoslavism changed multiple times since the creation of the 
“first Yugoslavia” (1918-1941). Coinciding with the constitutional concessions of 1965 and 1974, 
Yugoslavism was reinterpreted as “multinational Yugoslavism,” allowing for local identities to be 
expressed. When these local identities came into conflict, the political sphere fractured along 
ethnic boundaries, and when the western republics seceded, the country dissolved. 
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 human rights.17 Although almost every scholar of Yugoslavia would agree that the 
country dissolved for complex reasons and motives that were legitimized by 
imagined national histories, that is exactly how Cherif Bassiouni and other 
members of the Commission of Experts understood and portrayed the genesis of 
the ethnic conflict: as the result of primordial hatreds. 
For the nineteen months that the Commission of Experts existed, the group 
was limited in UN-sponsored resources and therefore had to operate efficiently and 
independently (i.e. privately). When the Commission was established in October 
1992, the United Nations Security Council appointed as Chairman of the 
Commission Frits Kalshoven, Professor of International Humanitarian Law at 
Leiden University (Netherlands), but less than a year later, Kalshoven resigned due 
to medical and personal reasons.  Until his resignation, DePaul University Law 
Professor and world-renowned expert of international law, Cherif Bassiouni, had 
served as Special Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of Facts, and in Fall 
1993 Bassiouni was made Chairman in Kalshoven’s absence.18 As one of the 
central founding members of the newly formed International Human Rights Law 
Institute (IHRLI) at DePaul University School of Law, Bassiouni utilized the legal 
                                                 
17 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, Revised Edition 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 206-7. 
18 The United Nations Commission of Experts, Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf, 7-8, 10. 
(hereafter: Final Report of the Commission of Experts). 
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 and research capabilities of the IHRLI when conducting research for the 
Commission. Additionally, the Commission was provided a severely limited 
budget, which prompted Bassiouni and IHRLI staff members to pursue $800,000 
(USD) in private funding for investigative trips to the former Yugoslavia: “In less 
than eight months, from July 1993 to March 1994, the Commission undertook 
thirty-five field missions, conducted several extensive investigations, gathered a 
large amount of evidence and information, and produced several major reports – 
all of which constitutes a starting point for the Prosecutor of the ICTFY.”19 
Bassiouni’s efforts were integral to the UN Security Council’s decision-making 
process vis-à-vis IHRLI-supported Commission status reports on the former 
Yugoslavia. Because Bassiouni was a central member of both the IHRLI and the 
Commission of Experts, his papers provide insight to the inner concepts that the 
groups and its members interacted with and reconciled. The majority of the 
sources interrogated herein were thus gathered from the M. Cherif Bassiouni 
Papers at DePaul University’s Special Collections and Archives, and most of these 
sources are administrative/legal documents with few exceptions: articles and 
letters mostly composed by Bassiouni. 
                                                 
19 The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1993, Human rights II – Cherif Bassiouni 
condemns ‘psychology’ of Balkan crimes, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers; and M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, 1994, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. Over the course of their 
involvement with the Commission of Experts, the IHRLI contributed over one million US dollars; 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 9. 
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 Perhaps the most informative experience Bassiouni had while managing 
the investigation of war crimes occurred in 1993, during a four-day trip to 
Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.20 While driving outside the city limits of 
Pale in an armored personnel carrier (APC), Bassiouni, William Fenrick (another 
member of the Commission of Experts), and their UN escorts were stopped when a 
Renault containing a Bosnian Serb paramilitary crashed into the side of the APC. 
More paramilitary arrived from the headquarters located up the road from the 
accident, and Bassiouni engaged in conversation with one English-speaking 
commander that had come to the scene. Bassiouni recalls in a letter shortly after 
the dangerous incident:  
During the long discussion I had with the unit “commander,” he made the 
case that the Croatians [sic.] were the “aggressors” against the Serbs, that 
the Serbs had been victimized so long by the Croats (particularly during 
WW II) and by the Muslims (particularly during the Ottoman occupation) 
and that what they (the Serbs) were doing to the Croats and to the Bosnian-
Muslims was justifiable because they were defending themselves or 
exacting revenge, ultimately only trying to regain the territory they 
believed was theirs.21  
 
Bassiouni repeated two prominent Serbian national myths: (1) recurrent Serb 
victimization by Muslim populations since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 
(“particularly during the Ottoman occupation”); and (2) that Serbs were the sole 
                                                 
20
 It was informative because Bassiouni references this trip in an article he wrote: M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Christian Science Monitor, 1993, An Argument for Peace at Serbian Checkpoint, 
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. He also explains the trip in great detail in a letter to a member of 
the IHRLI: M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. And 
lastly, Bassiouni recalls the trip in court: United States District Court, Southern District of New 
York, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić court transcription, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. 
21 M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. 
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 victims of genocide during the Second World War.22 This reporting does not prove 
Bassiouni bore a view of essentialism. It could mean just that: Bassiouni reporting 
on what basis Serb paramilitary legitimized their military actions in Bosnia and 
Croatia. Except, Bassiouni states in his letter to Julio Baez that the commander 
was “a graduate of Sarajevo University in history and had travelled abroad,” and in 
an article Bassiouni authored in The Christian Science Monitor, Bassiouni 
identifies the man as “[a]n English-speaking militiaman, a Serbian university 
graduate.”23 It is significant that Bassiouni portrays this commander as educated 
because Bassiouni viewed him as having some degree of intellectual authority, and 
Bassiouni incorporated the experience into his understanding of the conflict. 
Bassiouni eventually retold the story of being seized outside of Pale while 
on his four-day trip to Bosnia, but this time instead of writing an article or a letter, 
Bassiouni was expert witness to the defense in Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić:  
And if you forgive me just a little [anecdote], when I was seized by a group 
of militiamen outside Pale and held there for a while I sort of engaged them 
in conversation […] and one of them came up and in broken English and 
said, remember the Battle of Kosovo, and I said, this was 1398 [sic.] and he 
said, no, no, no, this is today. And whether it’s by belief or not, the point is 
                                                 
22 For more on the national myth of Serb victimization and the Battle of Kosovo, see Denitch, 72, 
and Wachtel, 197-219. For more on the thematization of Second World War genocide perpetrated 
against Serbs, especially in Serbian scholarship, see Sindbæk, 155. 
23 M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers; and M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Christian Science Monitor, 1993, An Argument for Peace at Serbian Checkpoint, 
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. 
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 that many of these things are still extremely present in the minds of 
people.24 
  
Seven years after the conversation with the paramilitary commander, Bassiouni 
was still citing the experience, but he no longer referred to the commander as 
educated – as a university graduate – like before. In the years that had elapsed, 
Bassiouni became more critical of the commander’s words and portrayed him as 
less intelligible than in Bassiouni’s previous iterations of the encounter, likely 
because he could scrutinize the source based on his experiences and research. But 
by the time the trial convened in 2000, Bassiouni had already substantially 
incorporated the commander’s words – Serbian nationalist myths – into the reports 
he had written for review by the UN Security Council. 
Greater digital and communications technology promulgated media 
coverage of the war in Bosnia and had great political influence because the media 
climate of the early 1990s was overloaded with images and reports of detention 
camps, mass graves, besieged cities, and battles between the Yugoslav populations 
and UN forces. Journalist pieces by Roy Gutman, Ed Vulliamy, John Burns, Penny 
Marshall, and Maggie O’Kane, for example, all contributed dramatically to the 
shift in public concern for the war in Bosnia.25 At the same time that these media 
sources called for greater global attention to the Balkans crisis, many sources 
                                                 
24 United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić 
court transcription, 2000, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 32, emphasis added. 
 
25 Allcock, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, 357. 
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 repeated Kaplan’s claim that the conflicts were due to innate ethnic hatreds. 
Because of the availability of media resources, one of the first major reports of the 
UN Commission of Experts was produced months after the establishment of the 
Commission in 1992. In preparation for the report, Bassiouni and two IHRLI 
research assistants analyzed hundreds of reports collected by the UNPROFOR, the 
UNHCR, nongovernmental organizations, and news accounts on the Yugoslav 
conflict, producing a single, compiled report of their findings. This report is 
significant because: (1) Bassiouni based his general conclusions on highly detailed 
examinations of potentially ahistorical claims; and (2) given the meticulousness of 
the report, the UN Security Council enacted some of the recommendations 
outlined. There are five major conclusions:  
[1] Most of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and in particular 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the scene of massive and systematic violations of 
human rights as well as grave violations of humanitarian law. [2] Human 
rights violations are being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict [3] Acts 
of violence are supported and encouraged by those in power. [4] The 
situation of those detained in camps is dramatic. [5] UNPROFOR and 
UNHCR cannot adequately protect the affected populations and cannot 
prevent violations of human rights.26 
 
Again, the Security Council was informed that all parties were committing 
violations, which could appear to constitute civil war. Given that deployment of 
the UNPROFOR and the UNHCR were the most exhaustive measures the UN 
could take at the time, the Security Council’s inability to increase involvement 
                                                 
26 M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports and Data Submitted to the 
Commission Between November 3-25, 1992, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 22-3, emphasis 
added (Hereafter: Examination and Analysis of Reports). 
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 prompted the Council to adopt other solutions Bassiouni recommended. For 
example, he proposed: “A warning of possible prosecution should be issued by the 
United Nations to authorities responsible for violations and human rights 
violations.”27 Coupled with his vehement support in establishing an international 
criminal court, Bassiouni’s effort was one prominent factor in the formation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on May 25, 
1993.28  
Another enacted solution of the Security Council originated from a series 
of recommendations in the same report based on media coverage: 
 
Establish an investigative commission. […] Establish an information 
agency, apart from local authorities, in order to disseminate objective 
information and given appropriate radio and television time in Zagreb, 
Belgrade and Sarajevo. Systematically collect data and documentation of 
war crimes to be used in subsequent prosecutions. Establish a commission 
to investigate cases where prosecution may be warranted.29 
 
These propositions were integrated into the overall purpose and direction of the 
Commission of Experts. Over the next two years, the IHRLI created a massive 
database of the Commission’s findings, and private funding allowed for the 
                                                 
27 Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 23.  
28 For more on Bassiouni’s advocacy of an international criminal court, see: M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
“The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court.” Indiana International & Comparative 
Law Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1-43. Also: M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Need for an 
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order,” Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 25, no. 2 (1992): 151-182. For more on Bassiouni’s integral influence on the 
ICTY, see Allcock, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, 358. 
 
29 Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 23-4. 
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 deployment of thirty-five field missions, which generated an impressive amount of 
evidence and material for the ICTY.30 The significance of this particular report by 
the Commission is that the members were exposed to a large array of sources on 
Yugoslavia, some recapitulating myths, others expressing the urgency of new and 
improved involvement. 
  The Final Report of the Commission of Experts (1994) and its annexes is a 
large compilation of writings and research gathered by the members of the 
Commission – as such, it presents both unclear descriptions of the conflict as well 
as clear, direct statements about genocidal acts. As it states in its introduction, the 
Report in its entirety is the result of twelve sessions in which the members 
reviewed and edited the text until its final version.31 One of the most integral 
notions of the Final Report is the plurality of conflicts taking place throughout the 
former Yugoslavia; more often then not, the authors refer to the war as a collection 
of separate conflicts and crimes (against humanity) instead of describing it as a 
uniform, single war. This would suggest each conflict be addressed individually, 
rather than collectively, thereby dividing peacekeeping efforts and ultimately 
leading to a selection of conflicts with which to intervene and those with which to 
                                                 
30 In addition to the private funding allocated to the IHRLI, the UN solicited UN member 
governments to donate a trust fund supporting the Commission’s operations – approximately 
$1,320,600 (USD) was donated, which was made available to the Commission of Experts in the 
summer of 1993; Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 9. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
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 standby and monitor. In the section in which the authors discuss the 
international/non-international character of the conflict(s), they write: 
To date, the major conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia have 
occurred in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Determining when 
these conflicts are internal and when they are international is a difficult 
task because the legally relevant facts are not yet generally agreed upon. 
This task is one which must be preformed by the International Tribunal.32 
 
Throughout the Final Report, the authors repeat that each conflict individually 
must be scrutinized and if applicable, be addressed by the ICTY, but a process of 
scrutiny implies that some conflicts are neither suited for the ICTY nor further 
UN involvement. The authors of the report concluded in their case study of 
Opština Prijedor, a Bosnian town overtaken by Serbs in the spring of 1992: “It is 
unquestionable that the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualify as 
crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is unlikely to be confirmed in court 
under due process of law that these events constitute genocide.”33  Interestingly, 
they imply that the events constitute genocide (or less specifically, “crimes 
against humanity”) – but the authors make no mention of the larger body of 
conflict scattered about the former Yugoslavia and express doubt that this 
particular conflict would be resolved internationally.  
The authors of the Final Report addressed this very issue of 
categorizing 
                                                 
32 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 13. 
33 Ibid., 43. 
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 individual conflicts in the introductory section of the report: 
Classification of the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as 
international or non-international depends on important factual and legal 
issues. If a conflict is classified as international, then the grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions […] apply as well as violations of the laws and 
customs of war. The treaty and customary law applicable to international 
armed conflicts is well-established. […] These legal sources do not use the 
terms ‘grave breaches’ or ‘war crimes.’ Further, the content of customary 
law applicable to internal armed conflict is debatable. As a result, in 
general, unless the parties to an internal armed conflict agree otherwise, 
the only offenses committed in internal armed conflict for which universal 
jurisdiction exists are ‘crimes against humanity’ and genocide, which 
apply irrespective of the conflicts’ classification.34 
 
In this passage, the authors reinforce the notion that the UN is dealing with 
conflicts and they concede that laws applicable to internal armed conflict are 
unresolved questions. This meant that a conflict would first have be scrutinized 
and classified as either internal or international, then if the conflict were 
international the Security Council still had to ensure its actions were in 
accordance with the statutes, protocols, declarations, and principles of the UN. 
Additionally, the authors point out the “applicable law” as the Geneva 
Conventions as well as several UN protocols. Altogether, these authors 
acknowledge that in cases of internal conflict, international intervention cannot be 
applied until evidence of genocide is confirmed, thus internal conflicts (or conflict 
chosen to be interpreted as such) posed great decisional challenges to the UN 
Security Council. Moreover, the author’s statement about crimes against 
                                                 
34 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 13. 
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 humanity constituting an international conflict contradicts the aforementioned 
example of Opština Prijedor, where evidence of crimes against humanity was 
present, though the Commission believed it would not be enough to classify the 
conflict as genocide in a court of international law. 
In the case of international conflict, the UN would have been obligated to 
enact many if not all of the solutions proposed by the authors of the Final Report 
because the UN relied on its declarations and protocols for legal guidance and 
precedence. As the authors wrote: “The Commission also concurs with respect to 
the provisions of applicable law contained in the statute of the International 
Tribunal. Indeed, in its first interim report (paras. 36-46), the Commission had 
taken the position which the Security Council later adopted in Resolution 827 
(1993).”35 But, UN involvement throughout the duration of the conflict remained 
fairly ineffectual, and the ICTY scarcely prosecuted perpetrators. The website of 
the ICTY reports that as of September 2016 – more than two decades since the 
ICTY was formed – only 161 individuals have been charged, with only 78 
indicted individuals having charges that include sexual violence and 
misconduct.36 
                                                 
35 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 71. 
36 The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, In Numbers, 
September 2016, The United Nations, http://www.icty.org/en/in-focus/crimes-sexual-violence/in-
numbers 
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   Although the Final Report also provides clear, direct statements about the 
war-torn conditions of the former Yugoslavia, these statements appear to not have 
had as much weight as the more problematic sections of the Report with regard to 
the members of the Security Council. Overall, the Report is unclear about 
applicable law in the case of crimes against humanity and internal conflict in 
relation to the former Yugoslavia. The dozens of applicable international laws 
created by the United Nations had great bearing on the members of the Security 
Council when considering the implications of the Final Report. It therefore seems 
that the authors (likely unknowingly) provided a type of framework and language 
that allowed decisions to be suspended pending litigation of UN statues and 
principles, international versus internal, genocide, perpetrators, victims, and 
consequences. 
Under the subheading of “Collection and analysis of information” within 
the Final Report, the Commission of Experts summarize different types of crimes 
against humanity and note that the presence of these types of crimes is not 
necessarily indicative of genocide. They conclude their summary on types of 
crimes with a description that allowed for crimes during a particular conflict 
(usually in a city or province, not the entirety of the war) to be viewed as evidence 
as crimes against humanity instead of evidence of genocide: 
Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations where there exists 
an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such, which are preconditions for genocide. Crimes 
24
Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol4/iss2/2
 against humanity are, however, serious international violations directed 
against the protected persons, in contradistinction to a fate befalling them 
merely as a side-effect, for example, of a military operation dictated by 
military necessity.37 
 
This implies that crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia could be 
viewed as independent of crimes of genocidal nature, and furthermore, some 
conflicts could be interpreted as internal – fracturing the larger body of conflict 
into smaller categories of internal, international, and genocidal conflicts. 
Furthermore, the authors provide the similar unclear language in their section 
summarizing the widespread nature of the acts, implicitly but ineffectually hinting 
at the policy of ethnic cleansing:  
Crimes against humanity may also amount to extermination of national, 
ethnical, racial, religious, or other groups, whether or not the intent that 
makes such crimes punishable as genocide can be proven. […] The scale 
and nature of such crimes become of special significance and of concern 
to the international community because of the abhorrent character of the 
overall policy, the means employed to carry out the policy and the number 
of victims in produces.38 
 
In this passage, the authors use the standard definition of genocide, but replace it 
with “crimes against humanity.”  It appears the authors were interchanging crimes 
against humanity and genocide in hopes that if either were further identified 
throughout the former Yugoslavia, the UN would increase involvement. However, 
given that the authors stated that crimes symptomatic of genocide could instead be 
labeled as crimes against humanity – and given the authors’ aforementioned 
                                                 
37 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, emphasis added, 22. 
38 Ibid., 24. 
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 expressed doubt at the likelihood of international recognition of the crimes against 
humanity as in the aforementioned example of Opština Prijedor – the authors may 
have unknowingly created a paradox in which involvement would be stayed 
pending resolution of evidence, categorization, and applicable law. 
 An important issue related to the laws applicable to the conflicts as 
international was the issue of self-determination in the case of the Bosnian Serbs 
that insisted they were entitled to secede and form a Greater Serbia. In the Final 
Report, the authors frequently dismiss all Bosnian Serb-run administrations and 
undermine any potential legitimacy of these Serb rebel republics. In their General 
Conclusions section, the authors make clear statements that simultaneously 
address the internal vs. international issue, as well as the issue of Bosnian Serb 
self-determination. They write that state disintegration is frequently regarded as a 
civil conflict, but add that: 
[when] the respective States of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared their independence, received international 
recognition and were admitted to membership in the United Nations, the 
conflict with respect to each of these States became an international 
conflict […] the precise time at which the different stages of this multi-
party conflict became or ceased to be a conflict of an international 
character must be determined by a review of legally relevant facts. In the 
event the Tribunal concludes that the conflict is of an international 
character, the ‘grave breaches’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 shall apply.39 
 
                                                 
39 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 70-1; the authors also used quotation marks around 
the name of any rebel Serb-founded republic, immediately indicating to the reader the 
Commission’s belief in the illegitimacy of these rebel zones. 
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 The authors were explicitly discounting the legitimacy of the “Serb Republic of 
Krajina” and other rebel Serb-founded governments in order to resolve the 
paradox created after acceptance of the secessions of Croatia and Bosnia as 
legitimate and denial of the seceding (Bosnian) Serbs. Because these republics 
were founded almost entirely on the war criminal actions of the Yugoslav 
National Army and Serb paramilitary, the authors easily dismissed these states. 
Nonetheless, the UN had to consider and fully dismiss the applied principle of 
self-determination that these Serb forces claimed before they could assess 
individual conflicts as internal or international, and finally, assess further 
involvement or not. 
 Due to the limited space of the Report, the authors appear to have relied a 
great deal on their compiled findings that constituted the annexes in order to 
explain in greater detail the intricacies of the Commission’s understandings. In the 
section titled “Genocide,” the authors make no strong statements supported with 
evidence about acts of genocide in the former Yugoslavia – perhaps because most 
of the evidence was contained to the annexes. Instead of using one of numerous 
examples they had at their disposal, the authors of the Final Report chose to 
describe genocide in theoretical ways: 
If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as 
such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the 
Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The case 
being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to destroy in 
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 whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not 
belong to the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A.40 
 
Unfortunately, the ICTY did not publish the annexes with the Final Report, nor 
were they donated to Special Collections and Archives at DePaul University 
where Bassiouni transferred his materials. It is unclear why the annexes were not 
published: some likely contained sensitive, confidential, or personally identifiable 
information, while others were analyses of all facets of the conflict – including its 
alleged past.  
Bassiouni does, however, summarize an important annex that delves into 
the history of conflicts in an article he published in 1994, the same year the Final 
Report was published by the Security Council. In his summary of the 
investigations into the region’s history, Bassiouni and the Commission compiled 
hundreds of years worth of conflicts in order to demonstrate that the warring 
populations of the Third Balkan War have always been at odds with one another: 
Annex IV [of the Final Report] pertains to the policy of ethnic cleansing. 
This 90-page report contains three sections: first, a history of conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia dating back to the first century A.D.; second, an 
analysis of the policy of ethnic cleansing; and, third, a study of the town of 
Zvornik […] Since the ethnic rivalries in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia are historically rooted, the first section describes the origins of 
the rivalries and the region’s turbulent past in the hope of providing an 
understanding of the perspective of the parties involved in the current 
conflict.41 
                                                 
40 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 25. 
41 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia,” Criminal Law Form: An International Journal 5, no. 2 (1994): 328. 
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A history of conflicts dating back to the first century A.D. was the result of 
overzealous research, and it is clear that since the Commission perceived 
centuries of conflicts to be connected to the present populations, they ascribed to 
an essentialist depiction of Balkans history. By suggesting that the populations 
were identical to their progenitors two millennia prior, the Commission was 
offering an ahistorical image of cultural preservation over time and unchanging 
criterion for the identities of Balkan nations.42 Moreover, by depicting these 
nations with a long-standing history of conflict (though untrue), the UN Security 
Council encountered difficulty in settling on a more effective solution than their 
efforts thus far.43 
Though Bassiouni led the Commission of Experts, he was not the only 
author to contribute to the Commission’s Final Report. Bassiouni credits two 
IHRLI staff attorneys for their contributions on Annex IV, one of these attorneys 
being Jan Brakel. While structuring the fourth annex of the Report, Brakel 
analyzed the 1986 draft “Memorandum” of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (SANU) because of its heightened media attention. Throughout the 
1990s, journalists often mislabeled the SANU Memorandum as a blueprint for 
                                                 
42 For more theory on the role of historical antecedents in nationalist movements, see Anthony 
Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). 
43 For more on the deficit of national identity-driven conflict between 600 AD and 1800 AD in the 
Balkans, see John V. A. Fine, Jr., When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study of 
Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern 
Periods (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
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 Serbian expansion, but scholars have demystified the document’s ideologies vis-à-
vis Serb nationalist expansion during the war. 44 Brakel identifies a level of 
intellectual poverty within the economically focused portion of the Memorandum, 
and he also writes in his analysis of the document: 
Finding a connection between the Memorandum and subsequent events 
may in this instance also betray a common journalistic overestimation of 
the power of the written word, as distinct from crediting the account to the 
more complex interplay of large forces (social, economic or political), 
mass psychology and its symbols, spoken exhortations, inspirational 
personalities, and the dynamic of open conflict itself once sparked by the 
intractable mix of things contemporary and historical.45 
 
What is particularly significant about Brakel’s review of the SANU Memorandum 
is that he critically responds to media sources that claim the Memorandum is a 
clear expansionist plan for belligerent Serb nationalists. Yet, Brakel, like 
Bassiouni, subscribed to the notion of age-old hatreds. Brakel’s usage of the term 
                                                 
44 As historian Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, the Memorandum’s propositions were largely not 
radical: “It does not advocate the redrawing of borders or ethnic cleansing, as has so often been 
alleged. In fact, it can hardly be called a ‘blueprint’ or even a ‘national programme’, if this is 
understood to mean a set of objectives and coveted territories, a time frame or a series of 
instructions for action.” Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation,” 181. A possible explanation for 
why news media outlets promulgated the Memorandum as a “blueprint for Serbian expansion” 
was the perceived connection between the document as a reaction to the movement for Kosovar 
independence and the bloodshed that started in the 1990s. In 1986, a draft Memorandum was 
leaked to a Yugoslav regime tabloid, and due to the Memorandum’s Serb nationalist content, the 
document set off widespread concern for the future of the Yugoslav federation and its republics. 
As Serbian politicians and members of the Belgrade intelligentsia perceived the country’s power-
relations and economics in increasingly Serbocentric terms, Slovenes and Croats distanced their 
respective republics and cultural institutions from the federal center. While the document was not 
a blueprint for Serbian nationalist expansion, it did, however, further open up discussions of 
nationalisms – Serbian, Kosovar, Croatian, and Slovenian – at the federal level, thereby bringing 
the country even closer to sociopolitical collapse given its vast economic problems. For more on 
the perspective of Croatian intellectuals in relation to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism, see Tihomir 
Cipek, op. cit.; for more on the Slovenian intelligentsia’s perspectives on Serbian hegemony, see 
Mitja Velikonja, op. cit. 
45
 Jan Brakel, 1994, The SANU “Memorandum,” The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 2-3. 
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 “historical” here refers to the Commission’s generalized history of Balkans region 
conflicts dating back to the first century AD, further indicating that the associates 
to and members of the Commission of Experts conceived of the populations as 
essentially different from one another while also simultaneously conceiving the 
populations as unchanged for nearly two millennia. Given Brakel’s skepticism 
toward media sources, it appears highly likely that Brakel either acceded to 
essentialism prior to his work with the Commission or he developed it while 
investigating. Regardless, Brakel believed the Yugoslav peoples had long-standing 
hatreds for one another, and his research efforts were part of the reports that 
informed the United Nations Security Council. 
Though it is difficult to determine if Bassiouni held an essentialist 
worldview prior to his appointment to the Commission, he certainly continued to 
conceive the nations of the former Yugoslavia within the framework of 
essentialism for years after the completion of the investigations. While serving as 
expert witness to the defense in Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić, Bassiouni was 
asked if the commission had looked into the history leading up to the events. He 
explained, “It was not part of our investigation. We did not have a mandate to look 
into the political evolution, but it was important to understand how things came 
about, for us to see how this conflict evolved. […] There has always been in Serbia 
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 a very strong nationalistic streak.”46 This distortion of historical fact, or at the very 
least a significant misreading of history, had unintended disastrous consequences.  
In depicting the conflict as both perpetual and as having victims on both 
sides, it comes as no surprise that the UN Security Council could not conceive of 
more effective intervention efforts; the UN was dealing with a fractured civil war – 
a habitual conflict that had always existed and would, perhaps, always exist. To 
complicate matters further, the UN honored the self-determination of the Slovenes, 
the Croats, and the Bosnians by recognizing the statehood of each of these three 
nations. This meant when the rebelling Bosnian Serbs attempted to break away 
from newly independent Bosnia and rejoin Serbia, the UN could not honor the 
action as one of self-determination. As William Maley succinctly observes: “The 
UN was faced in the former Yugoslavia with a conflict not simply between groups, 
but between principles – of the sovereignty of states, of self-determination, and, of 
human rights. These were all principles which the UN had played a major role in 
propagating.”47  
Though Cherif Bassiouni and the other members of the Commission of 
Experts intended to end the grave violations of human rights in the former 
Yugoslavia, their reports paired with the exhausted UNPROFOR and UNHCR 
worked against these humanitarian aspirations. In the end, the essentialist portrayal 
                                                 
46 United States District Court, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 
24, emphasis added. 
47 Maley, “The United Nations and Ethnic Conflict Management,” 563, emphasis in original. 
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 of ancient hatreds, the complications in applying the principle of self-
determination uniformly, and widespread victimization paralyzed the United 
Nations; and under these circumstances, ethnic cleansing and other grave breaches 
of international law persisted until military action interrupted the Yugoslav 
conflict and slowly ended it through the 1990s.  
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